# 2NC---UK RR---Race One [Read]

## ConCon

### ConCon---Kick---2NC

## Coercion DA

### Coercion DA---Kick---2NC

## Rates DA

### Impact---Development---2NC

### U---AT: Inflation = Long Term---2NC

#### 2. Cuts are coming BUT only if inflation remains contained.

Claire Jones & Kate Duguid 9-17, market editors for the Financial Times, “Federal Reserve cuts rates by quarter point and signals more to come”, Financial Times, 9-17-25, https://www.ft.com/content/f1d4522b-331e-45d5-b676-24dc5b8e3c92

The Federal Reserve has cut interest rates for the first time this year, reducing borrowing costs by a quarter point and signalling further reductions ahead as the labour market weakens.

The Federal Open Market Committee lowered the benchmark federal funds target range to 4 per cent to 4.25 per cent, matching Wall Street expectations.

Economic projections released alongside the Fed decision showed most of the central bank’s top leaders anticipated at least two further quarter-point reductions by the end of this year, marking a dovish shift from the last set of forecasts in June.

Wednesday’s rate cut was the first since December and came as the central bank signalled it viewed a deteriorating labour market as a more immediate risk than a rise in inflation triggered by Donald Trump’s tariffs.

“The labour market has softened. The case for there being a persistent inflation outbreak is less,” Fed chair Jay Powell said in a press conference following the meeting, pointing to data showing hiring had fallen sharply in recent months even as the jobless rate had remained low.

He added that the move was a “risk management cut”.

Wall Street’s blue-chip S&P 500 index closed down 0.1 per cent on Wednesday. The dollar index, which measures the currency against a basket of six peers, rose 0.3 per cent in choppy trading.

Asian markets mostly gained on Thursday, with mainland China’s CSI 300 index up 0.3 per cent, Japan’s Topix rising 0.6 per cent and South Korea’s Kospi jumping 1.1 per cent.

The Fed decision was not unanimous, with Stephen Miran, a Trump ally who was sworn in to the board on Tuesday, backing a bigger half-point cut.

But Christopher Waller and Michelle Bowman, two Fed governors who dissented in favour of a quarter-point cut in July, rallied behind the Fed chair.

Powell also managed to win the support of several regional Fed presidents, who had appeared more concerned about the risks to inflation than the weak labour market in the run-up to the meeting.

The reduction in borrowing costs follows several reports showing that hiring in the US is cooling sharply while, at the same time, the president’s tariffs are still having only a subdued impact on inflation.

The decision comes as Trump attacks the Fed and Powell, insisting the central bank should drastically lower borrowing costs to boost the economy.

Trump stepped up his assault last month, when he tried to fire Fed governor Lisa Cook over allegations of mortgage fraud, which she has denied.

Eleven of the central bank’s 12 rate-setters supported Wednesday’s decision to cut by a quarter point, including Cook. This week, Cook won the right to remain in place while a legal case she filed against the attempt to fire her makes its way through the court system.

The economic projections, which survey Fed governors and presidents of regional branches of the central bank, showed policymakers broadly in support of lowering rates further in the months ahead.

Nine Fed officials supported two quarter-point cuts this year. One thought the target range should be between 2.75 per cent and 3 per cent by the end of 2025, while another said rates should revert to 4.25 to 4.5 per cent.

“The labour market has clearly been cooling for some time . . . we’re at the point where the Fed had to intervene to think about the other side of the mandate,” said Michael de Pass, global head of rates trading at Citadel Securities, referring to the central bank’s dual goals of price stability and maximum employment.

Calvin Tse of BNP Paribas said the Fed was now in “risk management” mode, acting on big risks to the US labour market, rather than the current data. “Policy decisions in the remaining meetings of the year will be decidedly less data-dependent than historically.”

The move to lower borrowing costs comes despite a rise in consumer price inflation from 2.7 per cent in the year to July to 2.9 per cent in August, as the impact of Trump’s trade war feeds into US prices. The central bank’s preferred personal consumption expenditures price index is running at 2.6 per cent, above its 2 per cent target.

The Fed changes course

However, most Fed rate-setters said data showing fewer new jobs being created would help to contain wage growth and ensure any effect on inflation from tariffs would prove shortlived.

### Link---AT: Trump Turns the DA---2NC

### Link---AT: Monbiot---2NC

#### 2. Structural deregulation boosts growth.

Daniel Dew and Megan Jenkins 25, 2-20-25, Dew, JD, is legal policy director at the Pacific Legal Foundation, Jenkins, MA, leads Pacific Legal Foundation’s strategic research team, “Townhall: DOGE Could Unleash Our Economy and Restore Constitutional Guardrails,” https://pacificlegal.org/townhall-doge-could-unleash-our-economy-and-restore-constitutional-guardrails/

Regulatory reform is not just an abstract policy discussion—it is an economic imperative and a constitutional necessity. The creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) could help get America back on track by addressing the corrosive effect of overregulation on economic dynamism and constitutional principles.

The United States faces an existential threat in the form of a regulatory state that stifles innovation and economic growth. Excessive regulation chokes off economic potential, harming real Americans by increasing costs and limiting economic opportunity. At the same time, these regulations often result from unconstitutional overreach by executive agencies, bypassing Congress and undermining the separation of powers.

The concept of DOGE is rooted in the idea of reducing government overreach while respecting the boundaries of constitutional authority. By auditing, reducing, and optimizing federal regulations, such a department could unlock tremendous economic potential and restore accountability to the regulatory process.

Economics: The Case for Regulatory Reform

The economic argument for reducing regulatory burdens is straightforward. Excessive and outdated regulations impose costs on businesses, discouraging investment and innovation. The National Association of Manufacturers released a 2023 study that found federal regulations cost over $3 trillion annually in lost economic output. That equates to 12% of GDP—a staggering figure.

On the other hand, regulatory reform could unlock innovation, new employment opportunities, and greater prosperity. A 2013 study by economists John Dawson and John Seater estimated that reducing the federal regulatory burden to 1949 levels would increase the growth rate of the economy by 2% annually. Over time, that compounding growth would have real and positive effects for the American people. Consider the energy sector, where regulatory reform could unleash large-scale economic activity and lower costs for consumers. The permitting process for new energy projects can add up to ten years to a project timeline, due to overlapping federal and state requirements. Streamlining these processes would not only boost GDP; it also would reduce energy costs for consumers—a win-win scenario.

Similarly, the tech industry—including cryptocurrency markets—has been hamstrung by uncertain and overly aggressive regulatory actions. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other agencies often regulate through enforcement, creating uncertainty that deters investment. Providing clear, predictable rules would unleash the full potential of blockchain technologies and other innovations, further driving economic growth.

The Constitutional Argument

While the economic case for regulatory reform is compelling, the constitutional argument is equally urgent. Much of the federal regulatory apparatus operates in direct violation of the separation of powers, created by the Founders to protect individual liberty. Congress, not unelected bureaucrats, is constitutionally tasked with making laws. Yet agencies routinely create rules with the force of law, effectively legislating from the executive branch.

This “administrative state” undermines democratic accountability and concentrates power in ways the Founders explicitly sought to avoid. The Supreme Court has begun to push back, most notably in cases like West Virginia v. EPA, which curtailed the Environmental Protection Agency’s ability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions without clear congressional authorization. But the problem remains pervasive.

Reining in the administrative state would restore constitutional balance while reducing the economic drag of overregulation. If Congress had to explicitly authorize major regulatory actions, lawmakers would be forced to consider their economic implications and answer to voters for the consequences.

Innovation and the Path Forward

The power of innovation to drive economic growth is undeniable. Elon Musk’s ventures have revolutionized industries, from electric vehicles to space exploration. Ramaswamy’s advocacy for deregulation echoes the same ethos: Let entrepreneurs innovate without undue interference.

By focusing on reducing regulatory burdens and ensuring that rules are clear and constitutionally sound, DOGE could pave the way for a new era of innovation and economic growth. The rise of cryptocurrencies, gig work, ride-sharing, and other disruptive technologies reflects a public yearning for alternatives to outdated systems. But these innovations often face regulatory roadblocks that serve entrenched interests rather than the public good.

Reducing regulatory burdens doesn’t mean abandoning oversight or safety standards. It means prioritizing clarity, efficiency, and constitutionality. Congress should focus on passing broad, bipartisan regulatory reform, including measures like the REINS Act, which would require congressional approval for major rules.

A Dual Benefit: Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction

By aligning regulatory policy with both economic and constitutional principles, the U.S. can achieve a virtuous cycle of growth. Less regulation means more innovation and investment, leading to higher GDP and better outcomes for Americans. At the same time, restoring the proper separation of powers would make the government more accountable and less prone to overreach. At the end of the day, it’s regular Americans who would benefit from these reforms.

The stakes are high. Without significant reform, the U.S. risks falling into a cycle of stagnation, where high deficits and low growth feed each other in a downward spiral. But with bold action, we can unlock the potential of our economy while reaffirming the constitutional principles that make our nation exceptional.

### Link---2NC

#### This is especially true of Public sector unions.

Mailee Smith 25, Senior Director of Labor Policy and Staff Attorney at Illinois Policy, J.D. from the Valparaiso University School of Law, “How government unions work against interests of private-sector unions, taxpayers,” Illinois Policy, 01-08-2025, accessed 09-08-2025, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/how-government-unions-work-against-interests-of-private-sector-unions-taxpayers, DG

If early union activists thought government unions are so different, what are those differences?

First, there is no archetypal profit motive in the government sector. Congress passed laws promoting collective bargaining in the private sector to prevent the exploitation of workers by employers who were seeking to increase their profits through long work hours and poor working conditions. For example, the United Mine Workers of America was founded to bring coal miners out of horrible conditions and unregulated mines.11 In 1898, before Congress had even passed modern labor laws, that union secured its first contract, which guaranteed wage increases and an eight-hour day, among other provisions.12

That protection is inapplicable to government workers. Because the purpose of government is not to generate a higher profit, it therefore lacks the same incentive to exploit workers.13 Moreover, most government jobs are not dangerous, nor do they exist under horrible conditions. In fact, most union members in the United States are now professionals.14

Second, there is a natural check on union demands in the private sector. Private-sector union demands are limited by the company’s profit capacity and other competition in the marketplace. If a private-sector union demands too much, a company will eventually crumble or lose market share to less expensive competitors, and union workers will lose their jobs.

One example: Striking bakery workers drove iconic Hostess Brands Inc., out of business in 2012, triggering the closure of the company’s 33 bakeries, 565 distribution centers and 570 outlet stores.15 Then-CEO Gregory Rayburn explained the company simply did not have the financial resources to weather an extended nationwide strike. The closure affected 18,500 workers.16

There is no similar check in the public sector. Governments don’t permanently shut down or immediately go bankrupt because unions demand more money. Instead, taxes go up and taxpayers bear the burden.

Third, there is no competition in the public sector. The public sector is a monopoly. There is one source for government services. If a resident is displeased with the services her state provides, she cannot simply choose to seek those services elsewhere – barring a move to another state. If she is displeased with the operations of her local city government, she cannot choose to receive those services from the next town over without moving. The private sector, on the other hand, is competitive. If a consumer is unhappy with a service provided by a private business, he or she can shop elsewhere.

The monopolistic setup is compounded when government workers decide to strike. Strikes or other work stoppages by government workers can cripple state and local governments and shut down important public operations and services. This has an obvious detrimental impact on residents.

And that ties into the final, though perhaps most important, distinction: the very nature of government unions pits them against the taxpayers. In the private sector, increased union salaries and benefits are reflected in the services a company provides. Costs go up and are passed on to the consumers, or the employer eats the costs and earns less profit, or a combination of the two. If costs go up, consumers can decide to do business elsewhere. Unions are bargaining against the employer, not against the consumer.

In the public sector, unions are bargaining against the taxpayers. When government unions bargain for higher wages and greater benefits, they are demanding that taxpayers pay more or prioritize money away from other services. That, in turn, makes the demands of government unions inherently political. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, “decision making by a public employer is above all a political process.”17

What’s more, unions often pour millions into the political campaigns of the officials they are bargaining “against” at the negotiating table.18 Government unions, in essence, hire their own employers. Instead of fair and balanced bargaining, where a government employer is representing the interests of taxpayers, he or she is beholden to the union on the other side of the table. Taxpayers and their interests are not truly represented.19 It is very different from the private sector, in which there is a distinct differentiation between employer and union.

Warnings from early union activists went unheeded by politicians. In the 1960s, states began enacting laws allowing and regulating collective bargaining for government unions.20 By 1970, about half of state workers across the nation had gained collective bargaining privileges.21

Illinois followed in 1983.22 It’s now a state that proves those early activists correct.

#### They bargain too hard.

Daniel DiSalvo 10, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the City College of New York, Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Virginia, “The Trouble with Public Sector Unions,” National Affairs, Fall 2010, accessed 09-08-2025, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions, DG

A further important advantage that public-sector unions have over their private-sector counterparts is their relative freedom from market forces. In the private sector, the wage demands of union workers cannot exceed a certain threshold: If they do, they can render their employers uncompetitive, threatening workers' long-term job security. In the public sector, though, government is the monopoly provider of many services, eliminating any market pressures that might keep unions' demands in check. Moreover, unlike in the private sector, contract negotiations in the public sector are usually not highly adversarial; most government-agency mangers have little personal stake in such negotiations. Unlike executives accountable to shareholders and corporate boards, government managers generally get paid the same — and have the same likelihood of keeping their jobs — regardless of whether their operations are run efficiently. They therefore rarely play hardball with unions like business owners and managers do; there is little history of "union busting" in government.

Additionally, the rise and fall of businesses in the private sector means that unions must constantly engage in organizing efforts, reaching out to employees of newly created companies. In government agencies, on the other hand, once a union organizes workers, they usually remain organized — because the government doesn't go out of business. Public-employee unions can thus maintain membership levels with much less effort than can private-sector unions.

### Link---AT: No Link---Plan Small---2NC

#### 2. TROJAN HORSE---the plan creates a lucrative outside option for workers across the economy---provoking a feedback loop of wage hikes that spreads across industries.

David A. Green 22, Benjamin Sand, and Iain G. Snoddy; August 30; PhD, Professor, Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia; PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, York University; PhD, Associate, Analysis Group; Canadian Labour Economics Forum, “The impact of unions on nonunion wage setting: Threats and bargaining,” Working Paper Series No. 52, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/268258/1/1830595830.pdf

To understand the magnitude of our estimated outside option coefficients, recall from equation (11) that γ n 1 is the impact of a 1 dollar increase in the expected value of the outside option for a nonunion worker in industry i in city c on that worker’s wage. But this is only the immediate impact of a shift in, say, the unionisation rate. The resulting increase in the wage in i is an increase in the outside option for workers in other industries, inducing further increases in their wages that then imply an increase in the value of the outside option and the wage in industry i, which implies a further increase in the outside option for other industries, and so on. In the end, the total impact of a 1 dollar increase in the outside option value for the mean wage in industry i is γ n 1 1−γ n 1 . 32 Thus, our estimated initial impact of a one unit change in the value of the outside option of 0.66 (the average of the two estimates in column (5)) becomes 1.78 once we include feedback loops of the spillovers.

#### Employees in other industries would observe the plan and attempt to replicate union successes---causing emulation of union wage practices

Duck Ki Cho 24, PhD, Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Sydney Business School; Lyungmae Choi, Assistant Professor of Accounting, Finance & Economics Discipline, University of Newcastle; Journal of Corporate Finance, “Shadow union in local labor markets and corporate financing policies,” vol. 89, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924001068

In this study, we investigate whether there are externalities of a firm’s unionization that affect the financing policies of non-union firms in a geographically localized area. These externalities may operate through social learning or strategic interactions among local workers (Naidu, 2022, Bursztyn et al., 2021). Following the passage of a union election, non-union employees learn, through their social networks, more about the potential of unionization, its advantages and disadvantages, and tacit knowledge of how to organize unions successfully. Spatial proximity plays a crucial role in facilitating such knowledge spillovers (Jaffe et al., 1993). In addition to social learning, strategic complementarities predict that non-union employees are more likely to attempt to organize unions after observing a successful union election in the same local area. We call this externality “shadow union” effect.

Prior literature identifies two opposing forces that shape firms’ financial choices in response to the unionization of their own employees. On one hand, a firm has the incentive to use more debt financing strategically to reduce the funds that are negotiated with a potential union, thereby protecting its shareholder wealth against labor rents (Bronars and Deere, 1991, Perotti and Spier, 1993, Matsa, 2010): the union threat effect. On the other hand, a firm may use less debt financing to reserve financial flexibility because employing more rigid labor (e.g., arising from being unionized) would increase a firm’s operating risk and crowd out its financial leverage (Simintzi et al., 2015, Serfling, 2016): the financial flexibility effect.3 Which effect will dominate depends on whether firms ex-ante react to the threat of unionization in order to increase their bargaining power or ex-post react to the actual formation of a union to accommodate an increased need for financial flexibility (Schmalz, 2018). We are able to isolate the union threat effect from the financial flexibility effect by examining whether and how successful union organization in one firm gives other, non-unionized firms an ex-ante incentive to use more debt financing to combat the heightened threat of unionization.4 The mixed or null results documented in the literature are partly because the shadow union induces firms to internalize their bargaining considerations into capital structure even before the actual union formation.

Using union elections in both public and private firms that are obtained from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for the period 1977 to 2015, we find that firms, on average, increase their market leverage ratio by 0.9 to 1.3 percentage points, a 6.2% to 8.6% increase relative to the sample median, after another firm in the same local area — defined as a commuting zone — successfully organizes a union (or “union victory”). The identification strategy relies on the assumption of orthogonality between union victory in one firm and unobserved characteristics of other firms in the same local labor market that affect their financing decisions. As with any research seeking to infer causation, we cannot definitively confirm the validity of the identifying assumption. Instead, we undertake the following efforts. Even though some factors that affect the union election outcome in a firm may correlate with the firm’s own financing decisions, it is less likely that such factors correlate with other firms’ capital structure. We nonetheless include in our regression a rich set of fixed effects that capture time-varying, unobserved factors at the state and industry level, although doing so removes substantial identifying variation. In addition, by including firm fixed effects, we control for any fixed differences in leverage across firms.5 Lastly, our results do not seem to be driven by financial policy mimicking behavior (Leary and Roberts, 2014).

As documented in the recent studies (e.g., de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2020, Sun and Abraham, 2021, Borusyak et al., 2024), our baseline framework (i.e., panel regression-based event study) in settings with staggered treatment adoption may produce estimates that are not robust to heterogeneous treatment effects. To guard against potential bias and avoid “forbidden” comparisons, we employ the stacked regression approach used by Cengiz et al. (2019) with a matched sample. The estimated coefficients are larger than those obtained from the panel regression-based event study: firms increase their market leverage ratio by 1.3 to 1.7 percentage points. These results indicate that such issues likely attenuate the average treatment effects in our setting. We also estimate the dynamic effect of shadow unions and confirm that a parallel trend assumption is likely to hold.

Using financial leverage is not the only strategy a firm can implement to improve its bargaining position against a labor union. By holding less liquid assets, a firm can make a credible threat to the union with the risk of liquidity shortage (Klasa et al., 2009, Yi, 2020). Consistent with the notion of heightened union threat, we find that firms hold less cash reserves after shadow union organizing, suggesting that firms take more aggressive financial policies in response to the unionization of other firms in the same local labor market. We have further verified the robustness by conducting a battery of additional tests, including alternative definitions of local labor markets, placebo tests in which we randomly assign a firm’s local labor market, accounting for geographic dispersion of a firm’s operation, alternative measures of financial leverage, etc.

After having established the shadow union effect, we explore the potential channels of the effect. We propose that if one firm passes a union election, other non-unionized firms within the same local labor market would face a heightened threat of unionization. Such a heightened threat could incentivize firms to increase the use of debt in their capital structure, as modeled in Bronars and Deere (1991). In this model, the threat of unionization is determined by both the probability of organizing a collective bargaining unit and the amount of union rents conditional on unionization. Hence the threat is greater when (i) firms experience a larger increase in the probability of being organized and (ii) they face higher union rents once a union is organized. The marginal increase in the probability of unionization is larger when a firm’s workforce consists of a large number of middle-to-low wage workers because unions are more likely to organize workers in the middle-to-bottom of the wage distribution (Bivens et al., 2017). Furthermore, a more salient union victory (e.g., multiple shadow unions) would increase the probability that non-union firms in the same local labor market will unionize by a larger margin. Consistent with these ideas, we find that shadow unions have a stronger impact on the leverage ratio of non-union firms when these firms have a larger fraction of middle-to-low wage workers and when shadow unions are formed multiple times in local labor markets.

We further explore variations in union rents to confirm the heightened threat of unionization. Motivated by the labor unions literature, we identify three factors that affect union rents: labor intensity, unemployment rates, and product market competition. First, the total amount of union rents apparently increases as the labor share of total output increases. Second, high unemployment in firms’ geographic areas reduces union rents (Christofides and Oswald, 1992). Third, previous research on labor rent sharing shows that product market competition can lower union rents (Rose, 1987, Abowd and Lemieux, 1993, Guadalupe, 2007). In a series of conditional analyses, we indeed find that a union victory in one firm has a greater impact on the leverage of other, non-unionized firms that have higher union rents, which is consistent with the heightened threat channel.6

To validate whether the threat of unionization is sufficiently large enough to play a role in shaping corporate financing decisions, we examine the effect of a shadow union on wages. Wages should reflect workers’ enhanced bargaining power, much of which arises from credible threats. Following the formation of shadow unions, other non-union firms in the relevant labor market are more worried about workers being unionized, as a consequence, they are willing to set higher wages for workers (especially for those who may vote in favor of the union) to influence a union vote, thereby staving off unionization. Using aggregated wage data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, we find that, following a union victory, the average wages of employees in the relevant labor market increase by 0.9%. This is consistent with union spillover effects on the wages of non-union workers documented in the literature (Rosen, 1969, Fortin et al., 2019, Taschereau-Dumouchel, 2020). Furthermore, we find that the heightened threat by shadow unions increases the likelihood of subsequent union victories in local labor markets. These results thus reinforce the union threat channel through which strategic incentives to use debt could spill over into non-union firms within a local labor market.

#### Any increase in the value of outside options enables all workers to bargain.

David A. Green 22, Benjamin Sand, and Iain G. Snoddy; August 30; PhD, Professor, Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia; PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, York University; PhD, Associate, Analysis Group; Canadian Labour Economics Forum, “The impact of unions on nonunion wage setting: Threats and bargaining,” Working Paper Series No. 52, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/268258/1/1830595830.pdf

7 Conclusion

In this paper we provide new estimates of the impact of unions on nonunion wage setting. We allow the presence of unions to affect nonunion wages both through the typically discussed channel of nonunion firms emulating union wages in order to fend off the threat of unionisation and through a bargaining channel in which nonunion workers use the presence of union jobs as part of their outside option. We specify these channels in a search and bargaining model that includes union formation and, in our most complete model, the possibility of nonunion firm responses to the threat of unionisation. By formalising wage setting and union formation we derive a specification grounded in theory that provides guidance on what to control for, how to interpret our coefficients and what is in the error term. Based on that, we derive a set of instruments and a model-based over-identification test, the values for which imply that our identification strategy is appropriate for this data.

Our estimates indicate that deunionisation in the US after 1980 had a substantial effect on nonunion wages, in particular, and the wage structure in general. In a decomposition exercise, holding the probability a worker can find a union job, the probability a firm faces a unionisation drive, and union wage premia constant at their 1980 levels would have undone 38% of the 16% decline in the mean (composition constant) real wage in a typical city in the US between 1980 and 2010. While we find evidence for spillover effects of unions onto nonunion wage setting through both the traditional threat channel and the bargaining channel, it is the latter that dominates. That is important for policy makers looking for tools to help in raising wages. The union threat channel can only be implemented by increasing union power. But the bargaining channel is not specific to unions. Any policy that raises worker outside option values will raise wages for a wide set of workers (Beaudry et al. (2012), Caldwell and Danieli (2021)). Unions are just one mechanism for doing that – though our estimates indicate a powerful and direct one.

### Link---AT: Thumpers + Can’t Bargain---2NC

#### Factually incorrect---powerful federal unions will lobby Congress for pay increases.

Jessie Bur 21, covers federal IT and management, “Answers to federal workers’ questions about government labor unions," Federal Times, 9/1/21, https://www.federaltimes.com/management/hr/2021/09/01/answers-to-federal-workers-questions-about-government-labor-unions/

Federal unions don’t have a direct influence on employee pay and benefit options, though the lobbyists hired through union dues spend much of their time advocating for Congress to pass legislation that benefits government workers, including annual pay increases and expansions of benefits like paid parental leave.

#### Irrelevant---corporations AND employees intently follow the fed’s approach to unions---the plan’s precedent emboldens private sector unionization.

Mailee Smith 25, Senior Director of Labor Policy and Staff Attorney at Illinois Policy, J.D. from the Valparaiso University School of Law, “How government unions work against interests of private-sector unions, taxpayers,” Illinois Policy, 01-08-2025, accessed 09-08-2025, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/how-government-unions-work-against-interests-of-private-sector-unions-taxpayers

The treatment of federal workers and their unions is a bellwether for the rest of the labor movement. It’s a signal. Corporations look to the federal government and see what it’s doing. When Biden walks a picket line, that’s a signal to corporations that this administration is going to take a different approach than if the sitting federal government says it’s open season on federal workers.

In 1981 the corporations took their cue from Reagan. Again, it’s a bellwether for how corporations will feel emboldened to act towards their own unions and own workers. Ultimately I think that’s what the mission and goal is for Musk, to lower workers’ conditions across the board. As treatment of federal workers goes, so goes the rest of the workforce. Chris Dols had a good quote: “We’re the canary in the coal mine.” Just like it’s emboldening for workers when they see other workers going on strike and winning, corporations see union busting and it’s emboldening for them.

### AT: Powell Smart---2NC

### AT: Plan Solves---2NC

#### Rate cuts unlock a wave of investment into emerging markets.

Wesley Park 8-25, AI-powered financial analyst, “The Fed's September Dilemma: Strategic Positioning for Emerging Market Gains”, AInvest, 8-25-25, <https://www.ainvest.com/news/fed-september-dilemma-strategic-positioning-emerging-market-gains-2508/>, JA

The Federal Reserve’s September 2025 meeting has become a focal point for investors, particularly those with exposure to emerging market equities. With market pricing suggesting an 82% probability of a 25-basis-point rate cut [1], the potential shift in U.S. monetary policy could unlock a wave of capital flows into riskier assets. For emerging markets, this represents both an opportunity and a test of resilience.

The Fed’s dual mandate—tackling inflation while avoiding economic stagnation—has created a precarious balancing act. While inflation remains above 2%, the July jobs report revealed a cooling labor market, with hiring slowing and unemployment ticking upward [2]. This duality has pushed policymakers toward a cautious but data-dependent approach. Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s recent remarks, emphasizing the need to “proceed carefully” [4], underscore the central bank’s reluctance to overreact. Yet, the market’s near-certainty of a September cut reflects growing confidence that the Fed will prioritize growth over inflation in the short term.

For emerging market equities, the implications are profound. A weaker U.S. dollar, a likely byproduct of rate cuts, reduces the cost of repaying dollar-denominated debt for countries like Brazil and India, improving their fiscal flexibility [3]. Additionally, lower U.S. borrowing costs make emerging market stocks more attractive to global investors seeking higher yields. Historical data shows that a 4-percentage-point Fed rate cut correlates with a 32% surge in loan volumes to emerging markets [4], a trend that could fuel corporate expansion and infrastructure investment.

However, strategic positioning requires nuance. While the Fed’s pivot may boost equity valuations, investors must remain wary of geopolitical risks, such as escalating trade tensions, which could reignite inflationary pressures [2]. Currency volatility is another wildcard; a sudden reversal in Fed policy could trigger capital flight. Diversification across sectors and regions—favoring economies with strong fiscal discipline and export resilience—will be critical.

In conclusion, the September meeting is a pivotal moment. If the Fed cuts rates, emerging markets could see a short-term rally, but long-term gains will depend on how well these economies navigate external shocks. Investors should consider overweighting sectors like technology and renewable energy in emerging markets, where growth potential is robust and less tied to dollar cycles.

#### High rates collapse developing economies.

Carlos Arteta 23. Lead Economist at The World Bank, 7/18/2023, “Rising U.S. Interest Rates and Emerging Market Distress,” https://econofact.org/rising-u-s-interest-rates-and-emerging-market-distress

The recent swift tightening of monetary policy in advanced economies, especially the United States, in response to high inflation poses significant challenges to emerging market and developing economies. The international spillovers associated with rapidly rising U.S. interest rates can heighten the likelihood of financial distress in these economies; however, this likelihood depends upon the reasons why U.S. interest rates rise. Interest rate increases are likely to be particularly injurious when they are driven by market perceptions of more hawkish Federal Reserve policy. They are also more damaging in economies with pre-existing vulnerabilities. New research from the World Bank addresses these issues, analyzing the reasons for recent increases in U.S. interest rates, the effects on financial conditions in emerging and developing economies of these increases, and sources of the differences in the risk across these economies.

Increases in U.S. interest rates that reflect perceptions of more hawkish Fed policy have especially adverse spillovers on emerging and developing economies with greater economic vulnerabilities.

The Facts:

U.S. interest rates can rise due to different reasons. The World Bank study identifies three potential drivers for increases in U.S. Treasury bond yields: (1) “inflation shocks,” which reflect expectations of rising U.S. inflation, which encourage investors to demand higher interest rates to compensate them for inflation’s erosion of the value of future dollar payments; (2) “reaction shocks,” which reflect investors’ assessments that the Federal Reserve has shifted to a more aggressive monetary policy, implying the prospect of higher interest rates in the future that results in higher current interest rates; and (3) “real shocks,” prompted by improved prospects for U.S. economic activity which raises the demand for funding and, therefore, raises interest rates which represent the cost of borrowing. This study attributes the lion’s share of the recent steep and rapid rise in U.S. interest rates (the Federal Reserve raised the policy interest rate by 5 percentage points in 10 consecutive Open Market Committee meetings) to reaction shocks. Indeed, reaction shocks accounted for almost 60 percent of all shocks from early 2022 to May 2023. In contrast, inflation and real shocks accounted for about 20 percent each.

There are a range of reasons that higher U.S. interest rates adversely affect emerging market economies. One way is by making assets offered in emerging market economies less attractive, leading to lower financial flows to these countries. This increases the cost of borrowing in emerging markets, depressing demand. The falloff in capital flows also puts pressure on countries’ exchange rates to lose value against the dollar. This raises the cost of imports whose prices are denominated in dollars (as is the case with commodities like oil, foods, and raw materials, along with many manufactured goods) putting upward pressure on inflation. To counter these effects, emerging market central banks may raise their own domestic policy interest rates to continue to attract foreign funding and counter inflation, which depresses domestic demand. Higher interest rates, along with a depreciation against the dollar, make it more expensive to pay back borrowing denominated in dollars.

Increases in U.S. interest rates associated with higher inflation expectations or, especially, the perception that the Fed has shifted toward a more aggressive policy are likely to lead to more adverse spillovers on emerging and developing economies than when higher interest rates are the result of improved prospects for the U.S. economy. When U.S. interest rates rise because of a reaction shock or an inflation shock there is not an accompanying increase in U.S. income (which would draw in more exports from emerging and developing economies) as opposed to an increase in U.S. interest rates due to a real shock that raises prospects for U.S. growth. Using historical data, the World Bank study estimated that, for the average emerging market/developing economy, the probability of facing a financial crisis in a given year from 1985 to 2018 was 3½ percent. But the study estimated that the probability of a crisis almost doubled, to about 6½ percent, when the 2-year yields in the U.S. increased by 25 basis points because of market expectations of a shift toward more aggressive Fed policy. By comparison, the impact of an increase in interest rates due to improved prospects for the U.S. economy did not materially affect the likelihood of currency crises in emerging markets and developing economies.

#### Debt crisis escalates globally.

Philip Maldia Madsen 21, Research Analyst at Nordea, MSc in the Field of Mathematics and Finance at Copenhagen Business School, and Andreas Steno Larsen, Chief Global FX/FI Strategist at Nordea, “Global: Taper Tantrum 2.0… Time to Worry for Emerging Markets?”, Nordea, 2/25/2021, https://corporate.nordea.com/article/63715/global-taper-tantrum-2-0-time-to-worry-for-emerging-markets

External imbalances are not as heavy as in 2013. Current account deficits probably look “overly optimistic” due to the recessionary driven drop in exports in EM markets, which may or may not sugar-coat the risk of an EM sell-off should it occur. Structural current account deficits are though highly likely to re-emerge as the global economy gradually recovers, and the fragile five in Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil and India still had relatively large current account deficits measured relative to GDP back in Q4 2019 – before the Covid-19 storm hit. Those are (some of the) currencies to watch should we be proven right that a taper tantrum 2.0 could unveil itself during Q2, while Poland e.g. looks structurally better equipped to deal with a tantrum 2.0.

## Civil Service ADV

### Civil Service ADV---Rant---2NC

#### 8. Firings caused irreparable harm

William Roberts 2025, International Bar Association US Correspondent, “Trump 2.0 and the destruction of the state”, June 2, https://www.ibanet.org/Trump-2.0-and-the-destruction-of-the-state, accessed 8-23-25, HMc

The abrupt dismissal of nearly 20 per cent of the FDA’s workforce – which the administration says will reduce ‘bureaucratic sprawl’ – triggered paralysis at the agency. Key functions critical to the US food, pharmaceutical and medical industries all but shut down. ‘Lots of people were let go, almost haphazardly and cruelly in a way that made no sense,’ says Anne Walsh, Co-Chair of the IBA Healthcare and Life Sciences Law Committee.

Senior FDA leadership, anticipating the upheaval, began resigning en masse. ‘A lot of folks at high levels of leadership saw the writing on the wall and resigned. As it currently stands, there’s a loss of talent at the top,’ adds Walsh, who’s also a director at Hyman, Phelps & McNamara in Washington, DC.

As with many US agencies affected by the Trump administration’s layoffs, the FDA is today still suffering from staffing gaps and operational failures. Emails to FDA staff bounce back as undeliverable, while phone calls go unanswered. ‘The total silence at times is really hard to stomach, especially for publicly traded companies who require disclosure of information and timing. So, it’s really still a tough situation for the FDA,’ Walsh says.

Some former employees have now been brought back in a staffing ‘boomerang’. But it’ll probably be months or even years before key positions are filled and a sense of ‘normalcy’ returns to the FDA.

‘We are deeply concerned about the current state of the agency and its future,’ the non-profit group No Patient Left Behind says in a letter signed by more than 400 biotech executives who fear the loss of institutional knowledge at the FDA – a result of the reduction in the agency’s workforce and the wave of retirements – will jeopardise new financing deals.

The dismissals and chaos at the FDA reflect a pattern seen across other US agencies. President Trump is waging a campaign to dismantle the US administrative state by fundamentally altering the structure and function of federal agencies. His second-term agenda goes far beyond regulatory rollbacks into a wholesale remaking of the federal government.

Battling the ‘bureaucracy’ in Washington has long been a conservative cause. But what Trump is doing represents a radical restructuring that circumvents Congress and expands his presidential power in unprecedented, and potentially unconstitutional, ways.

Commentators warn the long-term impact may not necessarily be as good for business as President Trump claims to intend. By undermining institutions, circumventing procedures and sowing unpredictability, the Trump administration is introducing a new kind of structural volatility into the US regulatory regime.

Enter DOGE

The newly formed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), until recently led by President Trump’s billionaire backer Elon Musk, is asserting unprecedented authority to overhaul or eliminate government operations. Early personnel purges directed by Musk’s team shocked the Washington establishment.

The Trump administration shut down the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and is folding its functions into the State Department as it seeks to curtail the US’s overseas spending. The administration is attempting to close the Department of Education, expressing a desire to ‘return education authority to the states.’ Both agencies are authorised by Congress in statutes that President Trump is seeking to override by executive fiat.

The Defense Department alone is planning to slash up to 60,000 civilian roles. The Department of Health and Human Services is eliminating 20,000 jobs, including at the FDA, the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The Commerce, Labor, Interior, Housing and Urban Development departments and the Social Security Administration are all planning similar cuts.

Indeed, announced and planned job cuts by DOGE amount to a staggering 275,000 positions across 27 US agencies, according to data collected as of April by recruitment company Challenger, Gray & Christmas, as the Trump administration seeks to produce ‘efficiencies’.

Operating on President Trump’s word alone and without legislative authority from Congress, the actions of Musk and DOGE have led to a raft of federal lawsuits. These cases test the balance between the authority of Congress to mandate regulatory regimes and the president’s authority to revise or undo the work of agencies. The lawsuits are in various stages of argument and appeal. They will probably land before the Supreme Court.

In February, President Trump issued an executive order instructing all federal agency heads ‘in coordination with their DOGE Team Leads’ and the White House’s Office of Management and Budget to review all regulations and identify whole classes for elimination. ‘Ending Federal overreach and restoring the constitutional separation of powers is a priority of my Administration,’ Trump’s order says.

But the president’s approach is not just about deregulation. It’s a deconstruction of the administrative state. It’s about undermining the statutory mandates of federal agencies. More than simply repealing rules, the Trump administration’s actions will predictably disable enforcement and oversight by removing personnel and the functional machinery of government, commentators say.

### Civil Service ADV---Civil Service D---2NC

### Civil Service ADV---Disease D---2NC

#### It concludes quarantines and mitigation solves – inserted below in blue.

1AC Kim et al. 21, \*Kiseong Kim, Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center, BioBrain Inc.; Department of ICT Convergence System Engineering, Chonnam National University; Bio-Synergy Research Center; Moon Soul Graduate School of Future Strategy, (“Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading,” Applied Sciences, vol. 11, no. 7, 7, Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, 01/2021, p. 2997)

Several epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered. In this study, we present the results of an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, certain diseases can potentially infect all nodes in the human social networks, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact.

1. Introduction

The emergence of a pandemic is one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as a human extinction event, and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, several pandemics, such as the Black Death [4,5], Spanish flu [6], and those caused by smallpox [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [8], and Ebola [9], have affected a large population throughout history. The risk of pandemics increases with an increase in population mobility between cities, nations, and continents, thereby threatening humankind [10,11,12]. It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in society to minimize the damage from epidemic disasters; however, extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) [19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26].

In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental hypothesis states that when the epidemic spreads to all nodes of the network and the fatality rate is 100%, it can increase the pandemic risk. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of determining information flow during an epidemic.

2. Materials and Methods

We designed an epidemic simulation process to identify the relationship between pandemic risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials.

Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network. We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially infected. (C) We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the transition from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed.

2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model

We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts, respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000).

Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k).

2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model

For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential equations [21]:

where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery.

2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method

The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3).

At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4).

The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease. Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread.

2.4. Simulation Parameters

We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95 and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain.

The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk.

3. Results

Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as “extinctive spread”. Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high pandemic risk. In the real world, extinctive spreading indicates that the disease will infect every person in the society. From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined by β, γd, and k (Figure 6).

The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new infective nodes.

Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics. Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in quantifying the risk of epidemics.

4. Discussion

Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases. They investigated the distribution of susceptible, infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. However, they did not conduct a quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact between people. To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, we consider various connectivity and disease characteristics on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. The results revealed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction. Moreover, even if the disease band extends over the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, human extinction is possible. For example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people, human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to the society, thereby avoiding human extinction.

Additional considerations may improve our analysis. First, large population size and various proportions of initial infective nodes were not considered in the experiments. We have confirmed that the result was consistent when the proportion of initial infective nodes was 0.05% of the total population; however, this can vary depending on the distinct proportion of initial infective nodes in a different population. To achieve robust results, we need to perform additional experiments for various parameters; however, we could not address this issue due to computational complexity. Second, we did not consider numerous known epidemic diseases. We calculated the transmission rates of epidemic diseases using the known infectious periods and reproduction numbers of the epidemics from evidence in the literature. In the present study, we only considered five epidemic diseases, since the information on infectious periods and reproduction numbers of diseases was mostly unavailable for other epidemic diseases. Third, this study only considers the SIR model on scale-free networks in epidemic simulation. Since the dynamics of epidemic diseases can be varied in different models or networks, it is important to experiment in various simulation environments to confirm the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, these limitations can be considered in future experiments or using improved computational methods. With these further improvements, our approach can be used as a computational tool to analyze the risk of epidemic diseases.

5. Conclusions

In this study, we analyzed the risk of epidemic diseases by creating an epidemic simulation on a scale-free network. Based on the simulation results for various epidemic parameters, we confirmed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. We believe that identifying potential candidate diseases that may lead to human extinction is crucial in addressing epidemic prevention activities such as quarantine.


### Civil Service ADV---Pollution D---2NC

### Civil Service ADV---Ozone D---2NC

## Presidency ADV

### Presidency ADV---Rant---2NC

#### Perez was written in 2024, before Trump took office, and just predicts Trump will fire everyone. Newsflash, he already did that, and even rehiring people wouldn’t force him to fire their replacements.



### Presidency ADV---Trump D---2NC

#### B) Onis concedes they can’t solve OR it’s globally self-correcting. The US has lost all credibility BUT intervening actors check, cushioning the rest of the democracy laundry list.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Hence, part of the democratic peace framework remains relevant in our quest to establish a peaceful world. There is no simple policy message that follows from this analysis in the sense that there is no straightforward way off the path of authoritarian capitalism, especially as the West is losing its credentials to serve as the key engine of democratic transformation. It is possible, however, that a “democratization counter-wave” may emerge in the coming years where the primary impetus could come from societal pressures from below, with transnational linkages also playing a key part in this process.

### Presidency ADV---Democracy D---War---2NC

#### 3. Imai remodeled a year later and found no pacifying effect for the largest militaries

Kosuke Imai 22, Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University, et al., “Dynamic Stochastic Blockmodel Regression for Network Data: Application to International Militarized Conflicts”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, February 2022, Taylor & Francis

We use the dynMMSBM to conduct a dynamic analysis of international conflicts among states over the last two centuries. Political scientists have long sought to explain the causes of interstate conflict and predict its outbreak. In the study of the aforementioned democratic peace hypothesis, a significant body of evidence attests to the low rate of conflict among democratic dyads (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; Imai and Lo 2021). Others argue that the relationship is spurious, driven by impermanent geopolitical coalitions that generated common interests among democracies (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997; Gowa 2011). Analysts of the democratic peace typically want to account for these underlying coalitions, and in particular ask whether democratic political systems encourage states to enter the same geopolitical blocs—a question our model is designed to address.

Our findings provide several new insights into the origins of conflict in the international system. First, our model identifies two distinct blocs of democracies that exhibit disparate rates of conflict. One group, composed of states with lower levels of military capacity, rarely engages in conflict with other democracies. The other group exhibits no such pacific tendency, regularly engaging in militarized disputes among themselves and with others. Second, we demonstrate that the effect of democracy on conflict varies both across states and over time. Changes in domestic political institutions shift states between latent groups, making some states more pacific (e.g., Germany) but others more belligerent (Kosovo). Over time, the evolution of the group structure has reduced the average effect of democratization on conflict.

1.1 Related Models

Methodologically, our work extends the growing literature on dynamic modeling of network data that exhibit some degree of stochastic equivalence. In addition to the SBM, a variety of models are generally available to accommodate such networks. For instance, the latent position cluster model (Handcock, Raftery, and Tantrum 2007) and the recently developed ego-ERGM (Salter-Townshend and Murphy 2015) incorporate equivalence classes into the latent distance and the ERGM models, respectively. Although the more flexible SBM (and all SBM-based models, such as ours) can capture disassortative relationships that these other models have a harder time accommodating, they all share the highly restrictive assumption that nodes play a single role in all their interactions.

Models like the overlapping/multiple-membership SBM (Latouche et al. 2011; Kim and Leskovec 2013) or the MMSBM (Airoldi et al. 2008) fully address this issue by allowing nodes to belong to multiple equivalence classes. Typically, however, these models are limited by the fact that they assume independence of group memberships over time and across nodes, as well as independence of dyads conditional on the equivalence structure. This makes it difficult to accommodate networks that display both stochastic equivalence and some degree of heterogeneity across nodes (e.g., networks that have very skewed degree distributions).

Subsequent work therefore, relaxes some of these independence assumptions. For instance, Sweet, Thomas, and Junker (2014) incorporate dyadic covariates into the MMSBM, thus allowing for connectivity patterns that are not exclusively the result of the stochastic equivalence structure. And White and Murphy (2016) incorporate node-specific attributes as predictors of the mixed-membership vectors, thus eliminating the assumption that all nodes in an equivalence class are exchangeable. Recent work by Yan et al. (2019) shows that likelihood-based estimators of these covariate effect parameters have desirable asymptotic properties, lending further confidence in the validity of these extensions. The proposed dynMMSBM derives from these developments, allowing for dyadic covariates at the edge-formation stage and for nodal predictors of the mixed-membership vectors.

Even more attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption of independence of networks observed over time, resulting in important advances to apply the MMSBM in dynamic network settings (e.g., Xing, Fu, and Song 2010; Ho and Xing 2015; Fan, Cao, and Da Xu 2015). As most social networks have a temporal dimension, being able to model the dynamic evolution of relational outcomes is of paramount importance to applied researchers. However, while these models offer flexible approaches to accounting for temporal dynamics, they often rely on continuous state space approaches like the Kalman filter, making it difficult to periodize a network’s historical evolution.

Since researchers typically periodize history into distinct “epochs” to make sense of a phenomenon’s evolution, more discrete approaches to network dynamics would be better suited to the typical needs of social scientists. Accordingly, the dynMMSBM relies on a hidden Markov process to capture the evolution of equivalence class-based network formation. Furthermore, by assuming that the blockmodel itself (i.e., the matrix of edge propensities across and within latent classes) remains constant over time—so that only memberships into classes are allowed to evolve—we avoid the issues of identification raised by Matias and Miele (2017) that affect some of the earlier dynamic MMSBM specifications.

To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to simultaneously address the need to incorporate dyadic and nodal attributes as well as the need to account for temporal dynamics, in an effort to develop a model that can be readily employed in applied research.